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Abstract 
 An optimizing representative firm pays efficiency wages to skilled workers to produce 
technological innovations, which are assumed to be of labor saving type, affecting negatively 
the hiring rate of unskilled workers. The results are: i) The efficiency wage of skilled workers 
is determined by the Solow condition; ii) There is underemployment of unskilled workers 
whenever the added value of innovations is greater than the opportunity cost of skilled 
workers’ wages; iii) The optimal level of technology is independent of technological 
parameters; iv) The employment of skilled workers increases with the level of technology and 
decreases with the efficiency wage; v) The employment of unskilled workers is not 
necessarily negatively affected by technological innovations in the steady state. 
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1.Introduction 
     Recent literature has emphasized the important role of R&D and technological innovation 
as engine of the so-called endogenous growth (e.g Barro and Salai-Martin, 1995). On the 
main focuses of attention has been on the impact of human capital in the production of new 
goods, production processes and technology (e.g Romer,1990).The optimal allocation of 
human capital in the production of technology brings forward the design of incentives for 
skilled workers. This issue has been tackled by research based on agency theory and related 
models (e.g Aghion and Tirole,1994).   Efficiency wage models provide a simple form of 
incentive; which postulates a positive relationship between workers’effort and dedication and 
the wage paid by firms. Il its static formulation, the efficiency wage is set by an optimizing 
firm at the level that the effort-wage elasticity is equal to unity, which is known as the Solow 
condition (Solow,1979). 
 
        This paper presents an inter-temporal model where profit maximizing firms pay 
efficiency wages to skilled workers (scientists and engineers) as an incentive for them to 
create new modern knowledge that can be used in the industrial production process. The firms 
produce one final good  employing unskilled workers and use the technology created by 
skilled workers.  Unskilled workers are assumed to receive the market –clearing wage. The 
number of unskilled workers varies according to technological innovations. That is, jobs will 
be destroyed if technological innovations are labor saving type, which implies that the less 
unskilled will be hired after the technology has been adopted. 
 
       A number of appealing results are derived from our model. First, the efficiency wage paid 
to skilled workers is given by the Solow condition; Akerlof and Yellen (1986) argues due to 
the presence of turnover and/or shirking costs, firms have to pay a higher wage than one given 
by the Solow condition. The Solow condition also came under attack in recent dynamic 
efficiency wages (e.g Lin and Lai, 1994, Faria ,2000); Specifically, in dynamic models on 
knowledge creation and efficiency wage as Jellal and Zenou (2000), it is shown that the 
Solow condition does not hold necessarily. Therefore, our result is in sharp contrast with this 
literature. 
 
           The model also shows that the steady state modern industrialization given by the 
reached technological levels balances the hiring rate of unskilled with the quit rate. As a 
consequence, technology is not affected by the parameters of the production functions. 
Moreover, the employment strategy of skilled workers increases with technology and 
decreases with the efficiency wages. Finally, despite the introduction of labor saving 
technological innovation, the equilibrium number of unskilled workers is not necessarily 
negatively affected by technological path in the steady state. 
 
       The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model. The analysis 
of the steady state equilibrium appears in the section three. Section four concludes. 
 
 
     2. The Model 
          The representative firm employs two types of workers: skilled and unskilled. Skilled 
labor (S) is used to produce modern technical knowledge (A); In order to stimulate skilled 
workers the firm pays a wage above the market-clearing for skilled workers, that is, the firm 
pays efficiency wage w to skilled workers and market-clearing wage 
o
w to  unskilled 
workers. The stock of knowledge of the firm varies according to the difference between new 
knowledge of technology created by skilled workers and the knowledge that depreciates with 
time: 
              
   ASweGA                                            (1) 
 
Where 0 is the depreciation (obsolescence) rate of the stock of knowledge and G(.) is a 
well behaved production function of knowledge: 
 
0(.)'',0(.)'  GG  
 
The production function of the modern knowledge increases with number of skilled workers 
and their effort. The effort function e(w) increase with the  efficiency wage :                                                               
e’(w)>0, e’’(w)<01. 
 
          
       In order to model job creation, it is assumed that the number of employed unskilled 
workers (N) vary along time according to the difference between the number of hired 
unskilled workers (hN) and the number of unskilled workers that decide to quit from the firm 
(QN) ( e.g, Hoon and Phleps,1992). In line with the Ricardian idea that technological 
innovations displace workers (see Ricardo,1821), the hiring rate (h) of unskilled workers is 
supposed to decrease with technological innovations
2
 : 
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  NQAhN                                                        (2) 
 
      
      Finally, it is assumed that the firm internalizes all knowledge that is being produced by its 
skilled workers such as to use it as technology to produce the final good (Y) which price is 
normalized to unity. The production function of the final good depends on the stock of 
knowledge and the number of unskilled workers: 
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       The firm is assumed to maximize the present value of its cash flow by choosing the 
efficiency wage path and the number of skilled labor. Hence, the firm has to solve the 
following dynamic program: 
. 
                                                          
1
  In Shell’s (1966) seminal paper, technical knowledge is produced using a fraction of the output of the firm. In 
the present model the firm finances its R&D by paying skilled workers, and this is reflected on the cash flow of 
the firm. 
2
  The idea that great part of technological innovation is biaised toward labor saving technologies appears in 
Hicks (1932) , and triggered an enormous literature[e.g., Fellner (1961), Kennedy(1964), and Samuelson (1965), 
see Acemoglu (2001) for a modern approach]. 
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subject to: 
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A(0), S(0),N(0)>0 . 
 
 
    To solve this problem consider the following Hamiltonian function: 
        NQAhASweGNwwSNAFH
o
 ,  
where   and   are the costate variables of A and N, respectively, and represent the shadow 
prices of A and N as well. 
       
 The first order conditions are given by: 
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plus equations (1) and (2) and the transversality conditions. 
 
       The first result of this paper comes from the analysis of the above system. From equations 
(5) and (6) we obtain the following proposition. 
  
  Proposition 1 
   ‘‘The efficiency wage is given by the Solow condition: 
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   Proof: 
 
The result is obtained directly from the equation (5) and (6). 
The equilibrium  condition  :     
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                     (9)  determines the equilibrium 
value of the efficiency wage paid by the firm to skilled workers. It is important to stress that 
this condition is precisely the Solow condition. That is, in this dynamic efficiency wage 
model the optimal efficiency wage paid to skilled workers is given by the static Solow 
condition. 
 
     
3. The Steady State Equilibrium 
      In the past section, the equilibrium value of the efficiency wage paid to skilled workers 
was determined by the usual Solow condition. In order to determine the equilibrium values of 
the remaining endogenous variables of the model, we assess the stationary solution, which is 
found when  :      
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         The system of equations (10)-(14) determines the equilibrium values of the level of the 
modern technology 
*A , the number of skilled workers *S , the shadow price of knowledge 
creation 
* , the number of unskilled workers *N , and the shadow price of job creation * . It 
is easy to observe that this is a block recursive system. Equation (10) determines the 
equilibrium of level of technology that balances the hiring rate with the quit rate of the 
unskilled workers. Given 
*A and, *w , the optimal number of skilled workers is found through 
equation (11),  which balances the creation of new technical knowledge with the depreciation 
of old knowledge. Given 
*S and, *w , from equation (12) the shadow value of knowledge 
creation is determined. With  
* , and *A , the equilibrium number of unskilled is given by 
equation (13). 
Finally, given 
*N and, *A , the shadow value of job creation  
*  is determined. 
          
      It is important to note that in the above solution, due to positive technological spillovers, 
the marginal productivity of the unskilled workers can be greater than their wage. Notice that 
if the unskilled workers are paid their marginal  productivity : 
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It follows from equation (14) that the equilibrium shadow price of job creation is zero: 
* =0, 
and, equation (13) vanishes to : 
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as a consequence the system becomes super-determined and equation (13’) becomes 
redundant to determine the number of unskilled workers employed by the firm, which is now 
given by equation (15). 
         
   A close inspection of equation (13) shows that we can write the sign of     ),(
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 Using equations (9) and (11), we have: 
   
 
    





 

SweSGwe
Swr
NAFSgnwNAFSgn
AoN
'
,),(

 
Let    
 
 
 
   
 
,
  ,
,
,
  ,
'
  ,
NAF
wS
NAF
NAAF
MG
MMG
gSweM A   ,   and we obtain the 
following result. 
 
    
 
 
 
Proposition 2 
    ‘‘The unskilled workers size of  employment is given  by the following condition: 
                               rgSgnwNAFSgn
oN
),(                             .’’ 
 
Proof: 
     The condition is obtained by simple substitution of parameters. 
On can immediately observe  that we have the following insight given by  : 
 Under-employment when :         0),(  rgSgnwNAFSgn
oN
 
                                       rgrg 0  
where g is the added value of new innovation,  while  r  is the associated 
opportunity cost in terms of the skilled workers wages. The under-employment of unskilled 
workers is due to the firm’s skill bias. The firm prefers to hire skilled workers whenever the 
added value of innovations is greater than the opportunity cost of skilled workers’wages. This 
lead to  an under-employment of less skilled workers (unskilled). Of course the situation is 
inverted and we have over-employment of unskilled workers whenever the following 
condition holds :    
                                                         rg   
   Corollary 1 
   ‘‘The comparative static analysis of the steady state equilibrium raises the following results: 
i) The equilibrium  level of modern technology is independent of the efficiency wage 
as well as from the parameters of the production function of knowledge and final 
good 
ii) The equilibrium size of skilled workers increases with the level of technology and 
decreases with the efficiency wage. 
iii) The equilibrium shadow value of knowledge creation decreases with the efficiency 
wage and increases with the size of skilled workers. 
iv) The impact of the modern reached technology on the employment of unskilled 
workers is ambiguous. A rise in 
*A  can lead to more or less unemployment of 
unskilled workers. This is an interesting result, since we are using the Ricardian 
assumption that the technology is labor saving, one would expect to see a negative 
relationship between technology adoption and the unskilled labor employment in 
the steady state.         .” 
    4. Conclusion 
       This paper presents a model in which the firm aiming to upgrade her industry employs 
skilled workers to produce modern advanced technological knowledge. The firm employs this 
knowledge with unskilled workers to produce a final good. It pays efficiency wages as device 
to provide incentives for skilled workers. Technological innovations are assumed to be labor 
saving type, affecting negatively the hiring of unskilled workers. 
 
        The solution of the model provides many appealing results  relating efficiency wages, 
technological innovations and employment. The efficiency wage of skilled workers is 
determined by the Solow condition .There is under-employment of unskilled workers 
whenever the added value of innovations is greater than the opportunity cost of skilled 
worlers’wages. The optimal level of modern technology is independent of technological 
parameters. The employment of skilled workers increases with the level of technology and 
decreases with the efficiency wage. The employment of unskilled workers is ambiguously 
affected by technology. 
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